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WHY ARE THERE FOUR 
HEGELIAN JUDGMENTS? 
David Gray Carlson* 
Hegel is the philosopher of threes. In the Encyclopedia system, 
there is logic-nature-spirit. Within logic, there is being-essence-notion. 
Within notion, there is subject-object-idea. Within subjectivity, there is 
notion-judgment-syllogism. Yet, as everyone notices, when it comes to 
judgment, the structure is tetrachotomous. Here we find existence-re-
flection-necessity-notion. Why should there be four judgments when 
there are only three of everything else? Why must Shemp intrude upon 
the sublime perfection of Moe, Larry, and Curly? What need we 
d'Artagnan when Porthos, Athos, and Aramis seem the perfect three­
some? Three's company. Four's a crowd! 
In the Science of Logic,' Hegel does not allude very directly to the 
change, but in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel explains; 
[T]he different species of judgement derive their features from the 
universal forms of the logical idea itself. If we follow this clue, it will 
supply us with three chief kinds of judgement parallel to the stages of 
Being, Essence, and Notion. The second of these kinds, as required 
by the character of Essence, which is the stage of differentiation, must 
be doubled ... [W] hen the Notion, which is the unity of Being and 
Essence in a comprehensive thought, unfolds ... it must ̂ reproduce 
these two stages in a transformation proper to the notion. 
In this passage, Hegel suggests that it is the function of judgment 
to replay the objective logic, which had sublated itself at the end of 
essence. In the course of this dumb show for the sake of subjective 
notion, essence is the twice-told tale. Essence is the realm of mediation, 
so that judgment must be immediate, twice mediated, and notional (i.e., 
triune). 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Thanks to Jeanne Schroeder for 
comments on some early drafts. ru • c. cti. 
1 G W F HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC (A.V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinafter S J, 
For the German text, see G.W.F. HEGEL, WISSENSCHAFT DER LOGIK (Georg Lasson ed., 1975) 
[hereinafter WL]. 1a-7e^ 
2 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC § 171, at 236 (William Wallace trans., 1975). 
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Hegel returns to tetrachotomy of his method in his last chapter, 
where he writes that the negative moment is a correlative and an imme­
diate negation, both of which must be counted: 
If one insists on counting, this second immediate [i.e., the negation of 
the negation] is, in the course of the method as a whole, the third term 
to the first immediate and the mediated. It is also, however, the third 
term to the first or formal negative and to absolute negativity or the 
second negative; now as the first negative is already the second term, 
the term reckoned as third can also be reckoned as fourth, and instead 
of a triplicity, the abstract form may be taken as a quadruplicity, in this 
way, the negative or the difference is counted as a duality.^ 
Hegel does not limit the above remark to judgment. Perhaps he is 
saying that throughout the subjective logic, where the notion reestab­
lishes its own reality, there is always quadruplicity, since mediation (i.e., 
negativity) is always both a mediation and an immediacy. If so, the 
question arises why only the judgment chapter and, we should add, the 
first third of syllogism, are overtly tetradic in form. 
No doubt there is cause to suspect that the intrusion of te­
trachotomy is a non-event unworthy of our attention. In the introduc­
tion to the Science ofLo^c, Hegel suggests that the only valid exposition 
of philosophy is one that conforms to the "simple rhythm"^ of method, 
which is arguably triune. The divisions, headings, sections, and chapters 
serve only 
to facilitate a preliminary survey and strictly are only of historical 
value. They do not belong to the content and body of the science but 
are compilations of an external reflection which has already run 
through the whole of the exposition and consequently knows and in­
dicates in advance the sequence of its moments before these are 
brought forward by the subject matter itself.^ 
In other words, Hegel, having worked through the system, inserts 
the headings solely for expositional convenience. The headings have 
nothing to do with the logic. This leads one to believe that perhaps we 
3 SL, supra note 1, at 836; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 498. 
4 SL, supra note 1, at 54; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 35. 
5 SL, supra note 1, at 54-55; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 35. 
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should make nothing at all out of the quadripartite headings in 
Judgment. 
Shall we say that tetrachotomy is simply an error by Hegel? There 
is some reason to think so. In Measure, Hegel denounces Kant's table 
of categories precisely because they are tetrachotomous.^ No triplicity 
inheres between Kant's quantity, quality, relation, and modality, Hegel 
complains. For this very reason, Hegel writes, Kant "was unable to hit 
on the third to quality and quantity."^ Hegel implies that modality was 
Kant's true third—a term Hegel equates with Measure. Relation—the 
nominal third—is dismissed as merely an "insertion."® 
In spite of his measured "quadrophobia," Hegel's judgments corre­
spond to Kant's table of the logical functions of judgment from the 
Critique of Pure Reason. Yet, Kant says, the logical forms of judgment 
are directly connected to the very table of categories that Hegel has criti­
cized.^ According to the table of the logical functions in judgment; 
^ Kant's categories are as follows: I. Of Quantity—Unity. Plurality. Totality.; II. Of Qual­
ity—Reality. Negation. Limitation.; III. Of Relation—Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia 
et accidens). Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect). Of Community (reciprocity be­
tween the agent and patient) and; IV. Of Modality—Possibility-Impossibility. Existence-Non-
Existence. Necessity-Contingence. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 62 (J.M.D. 
Meiklejobn trans., 1990). 
7 SL, supra note 1, at 327; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 337. 
8 SL, supra note 1, at 327; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 337 ("Einscbiebung"). See David Gray 
Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Measure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 129, 135-37 (2003) for a discussion of 
Hegel's critique of Kant's tetrachotomy. 
9 In the logical function of judgment, the understanding synthesizes the manifold into one 
object. KANT, supra note 6, at 82-83. What judgment does is to bring the manifold under one 
of the categories. Id. at 83, 161. See RICHARD DIEN ^VINFIELD, AUTONOMY AND NORMATIV-
ITY: INVESTIGATIONS OF TRUTH, RIGHT, AND BEAUTY 59 (2001) ("Kant is taken to task for 
metaphysically stipulating the character of the transcendental structure by conceiving it as a 
noumenal self determined through such unfounded devices as a metaphysical deduction of the 
categories, which simply adopts, with certain unargued modifications, the typology of judgment 
of received tradition."). 
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Kant's Table of Logical Functions in Judgment^° 
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All of Hegel's judgments can be found here. Of course, Hegel 
reverses Kant's priority and analyzes qualitative judgments first, consis­
tent with the general priority of quality over quantity. He also renames 
the major headings. Instead of quantity-quality-relation-modality, 
Hegel gives us existence-reflection-necessity-notion. 
It is certainly odd that Hegel should criticize the quadripartite Ta­
ble of Categories while following the related Table of the Logical Func­
tions of Judgment. This led Marcuse to remark: 
Although Hegel convincingly demonstrates that what is meant and 
treated as judgment by ordinary linguistic usage aims at the same 
ontological content as discovered by him, the treatment of judgment 
in the formal logic is not fitted into this framework. Insofar as Hegel 
attempts to do so and insists on the traditional table of judgments, 
he confuses and obscures the great aspects of his own doctrine. 
Yet, in spite of the above, Slavoj liiek, a brilliant reader of the 
Science of Logic, defends Hegel: 
10 KANT, supra note 6, at 56. 
11 HERBERT MARCUSE, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY 127 (Seyla 
Benhabib trans., 1987). 
2004] WHY ARE THERE EOUR HEGELIAN JUDGMENTS? 147 
Let us immediately show our cards: the three judgments actually ac­
quire a fourth because 'Substance is Subject'; in other words, the 'lack 
of identity' between subject and predicate is posited as such in the 
fourth judgement (that of the Notion)/^ 
I want to join ^izek in defending Hegel's tetrachotomous judg­
ment but I will do so on somewhat different terms. I will argue that it is 
not the last but the first judgment—the judgment of existence or inher­
ence—that stands for the diversity of subject and predicate. The last 
judgment in fact vindicates a unity between identity and difference. 
The diverse subjectivity on display in the first of the judgments (which 
reappears in the last of the judgments) is an acknowledgement of an 
external reflection that haunts all parts of the Science of Logic. 
Why are there four judgments? Let me now show my cards, like 
the dummy in a bridge game. 
I. TOUR DE JUDGEMENT 
The notion is an individual. More precisely, it is universal, partic­
ular, and individual. We can put this colloquially: The notion is itself, 
its other, and the unity of itself and other. This can be expressed as ^4 = 
{A, B, Q, so that we have the following matrix: 
A = LFniversality = Itself 
B = Particularity = Other 
C = Individuality = Unity of Self and Other 
In the expression, A = {A, B, G}, A stands on both sides of the 
equation as the individual in its abstract and concrete forms. 
Let us now count the four judgments. 
(1) Judgment of Existence. In the judgment of existence, some 
property of the subject is singled out arbitrarily: Hegel's example is "the 
rose isfragrantN^ It has the form A = {A, B, Q, but this is misleading. 
The rose is still a rose even if not fragrant. In this first judgment, A is 
abstract and self-sufficient. It has no need of the predicate. Specula­
tively, A is the lack of identity between itself and the notion. Therefore, 
12 SiAvoj 2I2EK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL 
FACTOR 117 (1991). 
13 SL, supra note 1, at 633; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 275. 
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A - {A, B, C}, but also A ^ {A, B, C}.'"* At first, A (the subject of 
notion's self-judgment) is everything; the predicate {A, B, Q is noth­
ing. Individuality rests with A, the abstract universal. 
(2) Judgment of Reflection. Whereas the judgment of existence 
plucked some inessential predicate of the subject (the rose's fragrance), 
the judgment of reflection makes the predicate universal; the subject is 
merely an instance of the grander predicate: this thing is useful, or this 
man is mortal. 
In the earlier judgment of existence, A was what Hegel would call 
diverse from {A, B, C}. Diverse things are finite immediate beings. Fi­
nite Beings must, on their logic, pass away. Being diverse, A's fate is to 
become nothing. Accordingly, in the judgment of reflection, the sub­
ject becomes nothing. The predicate {A, B, Q is everything.Since 
the predicate is fixed, it now claims for itself the state of individuality 
at the expense of the subject. One way of expressing this is that abstract 
A (the subject) turns into notional B (particularity), so that now B = {A, 
B, Q. 
(3) Judgment of Necessity. In the judgment of necessity, the genetic 
requirements of the subject are emphasized. Instead of "this individual 
is mortal," we have "'all individuals are mortal." 
In the judgment of reflection, the subject (5) stated, "I do not 
exist. I am not the predicate {A, B, Q." Yet, if {A, B, Q is diverse, it. 
The supplementation of the equality with an inequality is pursuant to Hegel's very early 
instruction: 
[T]he subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of the predicate, and 
also that the predicate is more extensive than the subject. Now if the content is 
speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential mo­
ment, but in the judgement this is not expressed. ... To help express the speculative 
truth, the deficiency is made good in the first place by adding the contrary proposi­
t i o n  . . . .  
SL, supra note 1, at 90-91; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 76. 
15 In other words: 
Each partial and provisional element, therefore, fails to maintain itself in isolation, 
because its true and only nature is as a moment in the whole, so that it demands and 
goes over into its other to unite with it and to constitute a more complete and ade­
quate exemplification of the ultimate universal principle of wholeness. 
ERROL E. HARRIS, THE SPIRIT OF HEGEL 253 (1993). 
"S Or, to be more precise, the predicate has a reflective relationship to the subject. The 
predicate is the appearance of a subject. 
17 One of the consequences of the predicate's fixity is that the subject multiplies. The judg­
ments of reflection are therefore singular, particular (where there are a class of subjects distin­
guishable from other subjects), and universal. 
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too, must pass away as a finite being. But now B and {A, B, C\ have a 
commonality. They both must pass away. This is their necessary connec­
tion. Connection (or copula) is the only thing that has staying power. 
Subject and predicate have no being for self. Individuality now resides 
in the unity of subject and predicate. B morphs into C. Now C = {=, 
^}. C represents the relation of self and other, in our colloquial 
formula. But shall the copula be {=} or {9^}? This is a matter of blind 
accident. All we know is that subject and predicate are related positively 
or negatively. 
(4) Judgment of the Notion. The judgment of the notion is norma­
tive: this individual is as she should be, or this house is good. 
The copula was front and center in the earlier judgment of reflec­
tion. But copulae cannot do without subject and predicate. These are 
the means by which C, the individual, expresses itself as copula. Indi­
viduality as copula now subsumes subject and the predicate. Notion 
now knows itself to be fully present in all its moments. Key here is the 
idea that there are notional moments and non-notional moments. But 
how can we tell which is which? Nothing in these moments betrays 
their true nature. About these moments there is nothing but doubt— 
except that either the moments are notional or they are not. Mean­
while, C = {A, B, C} and C ̂  {A, B, C}. This is the judgment of the 
notion. 
Across the four judgments, then, individuality travels around. It 
starts as the subject, it travels to the predicate, it travels to the copula, 
and it encompasses the copula and the extremes while still preserving 
the necessity of non-notional contingency. By this means, the four 
judgments replicate the logic of quality, quantity, actuality, and 
notionality. 
II. TOUR DE SYLLOGISME 
We cannot leave the matter here. The chapter (i.e., syllogism) that 
follows hard upon the funeral-baked meats of judgment witnesses a res­
toration of triunity. If there were four judgments, why not four syllo­
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Whereas judgment is tetrachotomous, syllogism is trichotomous. 
There is no syllogism of the notion. Why is trichotomy restored after 
an interregnum in which tetrachotomy runs riot? 
Before I say why, let me summarize syllogism in plain terms. Pre­
sent here is a very simple move in which Hegel turns skepticism on 
itself. To illustrate, take the contradictory statement, "There are no 
truths." This is a truth. Similarly, "there is only subjectivity" is an ob­
jectivity. These paradoxes go to the very heart of Hegel's logical system. 
If we take the statement "there are no truths" to be A, and if we take the 
truth to be notion, the predicate of A is the truth. "There are no truths" 
can be expressed A ^ {A, B, C}. But this is a truth, which implies A 
= {A, B, Q. 
Here is how syllogism proceeds: 
(1) Syllogism of Existence. At the end of Judgment, the individual 
was the copula that colonized the extremes. This is syllogism. At this 
point, judgment ceased to be judgment. As G. R. G. Mure puts it, in 
the apodeictic judgment ("Notion is good"), the subject does not have 
goodness. To have is a relation of subject to predicate. Rather, the sub­
ject is goodness. There is a direct, performative connection between the 
extremes of the syllogism, which makes a distinction between subject 
and predicate no longer appropriate.'® 
Syllogism concerns proof, and proof for Hegel is the copula, or the 
middle term, between the extremes. But, between {A, B, C}, which of 
these is properly the middle term? Nothing in syllogism determines the 
matter definitively. An outside intelligence must establish this by mere 
dogmatic assertion. So the proposition that is proven is that all syllo­
gisms are subjective. They prove nothing. 
(2) Syllogism of Reflection. Notice the preceding theory of syllogism 
purports to be an induction. That syllogisms prove nothing presupposes 
that we have examined every single syllogism there ever was and, by 
empirical observation, have induced that failure is the universal predi­
cate. But this is to say that failure is really in the syllogisms after all. 
This claim is not subjective but belongs to the object. 
(3) Syllogism of Necessity. In the syllogism of reflection, every single 
syllogism was a failure. This implies that a single individual syllogism 
successfully represents every other. Syllogism presents us with perfect 
analogies. Analogy works if the individual is universal. The trait of one 
18 G.R.G. MURE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 136 (1965). 
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is the trait of every other. If the earth is inhabited, the moon must be 
inhabited, as Hegel famously reasoned. This is the syllogism of Neces­
sity. It stands for the fact that the individual notion is universal in its 
absolute necessity to particularize itself in the objective world. At this 
point, notion is objective. 
Let us return, however, to the Syllogism of Existence. Signifi­
cantly, it alone is tetrachotomous, like Judgment. The syllogism of Ex­
istence was supposed to be an objective proof, but it ended up 
depending on subjective judgment. In effect, syllogism falls back on the 
judgment of the notion. There is a precise coincidence between judg­
ment of the notion and the syllogism of Existence. That is why there 
are four syllogisms of Existence. The fourth syllogism is the utter failure 
of all syllogisms to prove anything. It stands for a retreat to subjective 
judgment as its essential truth. 
What 1 am suggesting is that there is a reverse double counting 
between judgment and syllogism. Judgment of the notion is exactly the 
same as the syllogism of Existence. The trichotomy of syllogism there­
fore swallows the excess in judgment. What was fourth in judgment 
becomes first in syllogism. If the fourth judgment shares an identity 
with the first syllogism (of three), triunity suppresses the tetrachotomy 
unloosed by judgment. The system renders itself apparently triune 
again. 
111. WHY FOUR ART THOU? 
With these brief tours de jugement et syllo^smes, we can finally say 
what the judgmental tetrachotomy means in relation to Hegel's entire 
logical system. 
Zizek claims that the system is haunted by the silent fourth and 
that the fourth judgment represents the manifestation of this vanishing 
mediator.^® Zizek compares the silent fourth to the dummy in contract 
bridge. In bridge, the partner who first names the trumps seizes control 
of the partnership.^' The silent partner must lay down her hand and 
remain silent. Table talk, though common, is strictly forbidden. In her 
silence, the dummy nevertheless controls the game. All players react to 
the dummy. 
19 SL, supra note 1, at 692; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 339. 
20 iiiek, supra note 12, at 179. 
21 Id. 
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A silent fourth occupies the entire Objective Logic.^^ Early on, the 
understanding emerges as such tvhen it proposes that becoming is a de­
terminate being. Hegel writes, "That the whole, the unity of being and 
nothing, is in the one-sided determinateness of being is an external re­
flection; but in the negation, in something and other and so on, it will 
come to be positedP^^ Here, Hegel says that this conclusion of the Un­
derstanding—that becoming is—is not strictly necessitated as a matter 
of logic. It comes from the outside. This external reflection is the silent 
fourth that energizes the logic. 
Later, Hegel writes that quantity depends upon an other for its 
determination. Who is this other but the silent fourth? Of quantity, 
H e g e l  w r i t e s  t h a t  " d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s  i n  g e n e r a l  i s  o u t s i d e  i t s e l f . Q u a n ­
tity is "posited as self-repelling, as in fact having the relation-to-self as a 
determinateness in another something (which is for itself). This 
means that quantitative distinction is externally imposed. Quantity re­
quires a silent fourth—an external mathematician who counts. 
Measure likewise points to a measurer—a silent fourth external to 
the logic itself that raises the temperature of things in order to produce a 
qualitative change. Qualitative change is accomplished by quantitative 
change, which is defined as that which comes from the outside. "As a 
quantum [Measure] is an indifferent magnitude open to external deter­
mination and capable of increase and decrease. But as a measure it is 
also distinguished from itself as a quantum, as such an indifferent deter­
mination, and is a limitation of that indifferent fluctuation about a 
limit."^^ Thus, Measure stands for susceptibility to outside manipula­
tion. A silent fourth is directly implied by Measure. 
Essence points to the fourth whenever the concept of external re­
flection is invoked. External reflection implies a thing's indifference to 
what an outside intelligence thinks of it.^^ This external intelligence is 
likewise the silent fourth—the subjectivity that being requires in order 
to endure over time. 
22 See CLARK BUTLER, HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY 232 (1996) 
("Our own subjectivity is concealed in out objective world"). 
23 SL, supra note 1, at 110; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 97. 
24 SL, supra note 1, at 185; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 177. 
25 SL, supra note 1, at 185; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 177. 
26 SL, supra note 1, at 334; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 344. 
27 For this reason, external reflection is "a positing of the immediate. . . . SL, supra note 1, 
at 403; 1 WL, supra note 1, at 18. 
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There is, however, a strange reversal when we reach the notion. 
The notion is the result of finite being having passed away. What re­
mains standing is the notion. But passing away is always also a preserva­
tion. This is the law of sublation. As all Hegelians know, aufheben 
means simultaneously to cancel and to preserve. 
What is preserved in notion is a ghostly memory of Being.^® Being 
is inwardized or recollected immediacy or abstraction^^ This now be­
comes the silent fourth to notion—the thing that traumatizes the sub­
ject and keeps it in motion. Whereas the silent fourth had been a 
subjective intrusion on the object, now the silent fourth is an objective 
intrusion on the subject. This is what provokes the system to identify 
the universal as the first element of the notional trinity. This act of 
abstraction is precisely what the notional individual cannot swallow. 
This is why the notion is self-divisive and generative of the realm of 
judgment. There is the absent reality that notion must fill out through 
the dumb show of judgment. 
Ironically, the silent fourth in the realm of being was the subjectiv­
ity yet to come. Now the silent fourth becomes the trauma of the being 
that was supposedly repressed.^" 
The silent fourth finally speaks in judgment. It is the extraneous, 
mad, external mediator that binds the system together. It turns out that 
Shemp was truly in charge of the Stooges all along, even though he 
appeared at the dusk of their long career, when the owl of Stooge Mi­
nerva finally flew. 
Precisely where does this mad moment of disjunction (which 
secretly conjoins all) appear? It is present in the judgment of existence. 
But it is swallowed again by the predicate, reappears in the copula and 
continues into syllogism. 
28 See ERMANNO BENCIVENGA, HEGEL'S DIALECTICAL LOGIC 12 (2002) ("Hegel's logic is 
one of recollection, of memory, its necessity is the internal consistency of what is remembered 
....") (footnote omitted). 
29 Erinnerung can be translated as inwardization or recollection. Thus, Miller s translation 
reads: "Not until knowing inwardizes, recollects itself out of immediate being, does it through 
this mediation find essence." SL, supra note 1, at 389; 2 WL, supra note 1, at 3 ( Erst indem 
das Wissen sich aus dem unmittelbaren Sein etinnert, dutch diese Vermitdung finder es das 
Wesen."). 
30 BUTLER, supra note 22, at 233 ("The subjective self-concept encounters an object which 
is the dead remnant of that very subjective self-concept, a remnant left over from its incipient 
historical self-construction."). 
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It even survives syllogism. The disjunctive syllogism represents the 
point that the universal subject is all its predicates, but this subject still 
requires a non-notional object—a non-universal that constitutes a 
fourth to triune subjectivity. The subject's object must eventually be 
rendered notional. Through the dialectic of objectivity (mechanism-
chemism-teleology), the silent fourth is further developed until, in Tele­
ology, the silent fourth is revealed to be the subject's very own self. Two 
subjects face each other in Teleology. The silent fourth itself becomes 
three. Shemp is now Moe, Larry and Curly. That is the very Idea of 
Hegel's Science of Logic. 
Yet, neither is Idea exempt from the trauma of the silent fourth. In 
Hegel's very last chapter, method and subject matter supposedly con­
join.^' Method is the one and only subject. We have the Understand­
ing, its negation. Dialectical Reason, and the Negation of the 
Negation—Speculative Reason. But when all is said and done, there is a 
hole in the whole. Negation of the negation is not the restoration of the 
positive thing originally negated. It is less than that. This very absence 
is the silent fourth—the non-notional individual that guarantees that 
Logic never ends. It is only by virtue of the silent fourth that Logic is a 
circle. What traumatizes the method is the silent fourth rendered mani­
fest for a moment in Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Hegel's method is traditionally viewed as the passage from immedi­
ate Understanding to mediated Dialectical Reason to Speculative Rea­
son, which holds the prior two positions in tension. Yet there is always a 
fourth. Method must work on something. This something is an irra­
tional, non-methodical material without which the Heracleitan flux can­
not flow. In the judgment chapter, this silent fourth, like Garbo, finally 
speaks. In judgment, not only must the notion objectify itself in a no­
tional way, it must judge its non-self—say what this is. The three no­
tional moments, together with the non-notional self, comprise Hegel's 
four judgments. 
31 Angelica Nuzzo describes how method ultimately stands over against all of the "errone­
ous" moments of the logic that precedes it. Angelica Nuzzo, The End of Hegel's Logic: Absolute 
Idea as Absolute Method, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLV AND ETHICS J. 203 (2005). 
